V2 Standard Country Code Numeric codes developed by Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer and Melvin Small, and presented in "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List," V4 Economic Cluster of Country 28 1. High (developed) 29 2. Medium (transitional) 29 3. Low (low) V5 Geocultural Cluster of Country 11 1. Africa south of the Sahara 25 2. Asia and North Africa 20 3. Latin (including Spain, Portugal, and Puerto Rico) 30 4. Europe (including Israel and European-settled countries of North America, the Pacific, and Southern Africa) V6 Political Cluster of Country 15 1. Personalist 16 2. Elitist 19 3. Centrist 17 4. New democracy 19 5. Old democracy V7 Country Population, Mid-1963, in 100,000's NOTE: The number in parentheses refers to the study in which the investigator first used this indicator either separately or in combination with other variables. V8 GNP Per Capita, 1965, (1) V11 Percentage of Population in Cities of 20,000+, Various years 1955-1963, (3) V12 Primary and Secondary School Enrollments as a Percentage of Population Aged 5-19, ca. 1960 (2) V19 Percentage Annual Population Growth, 1950-65 V22 Age Bulge Ratio, 1970 The ratio of youth population, 15-24, to adult population, 25-60. V26 Rate of Urban Population Growth 1960-1970 Computational procedure as for Var. 25. V33 Adverse Economic Conditions, 1960-1963, (2) Summary news sources were searched for evaluative statements about adverse internal economic conditions such as crop failures, unemployment, export market slumps, drought, etc. Each such description was coded on the following intensity and extent scales: "Severity" (Intensity)Scores 1 Moderate 2 Substantial, or moderate and persisting for more than one year 3 Severe, or substantial and persisting for more than one year 4 Severe and persisting for more than one year "Proportion Affected" (Extent) Scores 0.2 One region or city or a small economic sector 0.5 Several regions or cities, or several economic sectors 0.7 Much of country, or several major or one dominant economic sector 1.0 Whole country, or all economic sectors The score for each such condition is the product of the extent and intensity scores: the score for each country and for each year is the sum of the "condition" scores: and the score used for Var. 33 is the sum of annual scores for 1960-1963. V42 Points Change in Cost-of-Living Index, 1960-1963, (2) V45 Ethnic Linguistic Practionalization Index x 100, ATLAS NABODOY MIRA data, (6) V46 Strain Resulting from Religious Cleavages, ca 1960, (2) Severity of religious cleavages is the sum of scores on the following two scales: Number of organized religious groups with 25%+ of population 0. One such organized group only in 1960 1. Two groups 2. Three groups 3. Four or more groups Duration of coexistence of religious groups 0. One group only in 1960 1. All groups have coexisted in the territory now comprising the state for 100+ years before 1961 2. One or more groups was established from 50 to 200 years before 1961 3. One or more groups was established within 50 years of 1961 Resulting scores: 21 0. Minimum strain 17 1. 20 2. 6 3. 18 4. 8 6. Maximum strain 1 9. Missing data V48 Social Immobility, ca. 1960 Codes are adapted and expanded from Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, SOCIETY, POLITICS, and ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). Adelman and Morris coded most of the developing countries on a seven-category version of the scale. The principal investigator coded the remaining countries on an expanded scale. 3 00. School enrollment ratio (SER) 60%+ and middle class (proportion of economically-active male population engaged in middle-class occupations) 3-0%+ and no substantial discrimination or stratification. Note that the coding for "modern" countries follows the procedure used by Adelman and Morris: the presence of discrimination/stratification adds 1 to 3 points to the immobility score. (Adelman and Morris = none) 8 01. SER 60% + or middle class 30%+, no discrimination (Adelman and Morris = none) 8 02. SER 50-60%+ and middle class 20-30%, no discrimination (Adelman and Morris = none) 10 03. SER 50%+ or middle class 20-30%, no discrimination (Adelman and Morris = A+) 15 04. SER 40-50% and middle class 10-20%, no discrimination (Adelman and Morris = A+) 4 05. Countries with A+ or a SER and middle-class scores but with marked stratification (Adelman and Morris = A-) 2 06. Appears only for a few countries with high SER and middle-class ratios but with substantial discrimination (Adelman and Morris = none) 18 07. SER 25-40%, middle class 5-10%; or countries meeting the first two criteria for A scores but having prohibitive discriminatory barriers to mobility (Adelman and Morris = B) 0 08. (No countries receive this score) 10 09. SER more than 25%, or very small but rapidly growing middle class (Adelman and Morris = C+) 8 10. SER less than 25%, very small middle class (Adelman and Morris=C) 0 11. SER less than 25%, very small middle class, prohibitive discriminatory barriers to mobility affecting a portion of the popula- tion (Adelman and Morris = C-) 0 12. SER less than 25%, very small middle class, discriminatory barriers affect almost the entire population (Adelman and Morris = none) V49 Intensity of Economic Discrimination ca. 1963, (4) Variables 49 to 54 are based on identifications of social groups subject to systematic discrimination on various ascriptive grounds. A detailed description of procedures and a table listing groups so coded, and scores, is given in Appendix C. 44 0. None 12 1. Most higher economic value positions, or some specific classes or economic activity, are closed to the group 18 2. Most higher and some medium economic value positions are closed, or many specific classes of economic activity 11 3. Most higher and most medium economic value positions are closed 1. 4. Almost all higher, medium, and some lower economic value positions are closed V50 Proportion of total Population Affected by Economic Discrimination, ca. 1963, (1) Rounded to nearest .05. See Var. 49. V52 Intensity of Political Discrimination ca. 1963, (4) See Var. 49. 44 0. None 18 1. Some significant political elite positions are closed to the group, OR some participatory activities (party membership, voting, etc.) 26 2. Most of all political elite positions are closed or most participatory activities, or some of both 1 3. Most or all political elite positions and some participatory activities are closed 1 4. Most or all political elite positions and most or all participatory activities are closed V53 Proportion of Total Population Affected by Political Discrimination, ca. 1963, (1) Rounded to nearest .05. See Var. 52. V59 Number of External Interventions 1956-60 by another nation or rebel group operating from outside the country Source: WHII, table 3.6 V60 External Support for Dissidents, 1961-65, (3) Each conflict event coded between 1961 and 1965 (see Gurr, "Causal Model," 1108-09) was scored for maximum level of foreign support (if any) for dissidents and regimes engaged in open strife on the following two scales. SUPPORT FOR DISSIDENTS 0 none apparent 1 arms and supplies 2 provision of refuge 3 provision of facilities, training 4 military advisors, mercenaries 5 military units SUPPORT FOR REGIME 0 none apparent 1 non-military aid 2 military material 4 personnel, facilities 5 military units For each event, the "support" score was multiplied by the NUMBER OF NATIONS providing any such support. The "dissident support" and "regime support" scores thus obtained were separately aggregated for all events in a country, 1961-65. The two distributions of scores were sharply skewed, so were rescaled using the following geometric progression: 60 00. 0 -- Low support 2 01. 1 8 02. 2 7 03. 3-4 3 04. 5-6 2 05. 7-9 1 06. 10-15 1 07. 16-22 0 08. 23-33 0 09. 34-50 2 10. 51-75 0 11. 76-112 -- High support V61 External Support for Regime, 1961-1965, (3) See Var. 60. 77 00. 0 -- Low support 0 01. 1 0 02. 2 2 03. 3-4 3 04. 5-6 0 05. 7-9 1 06. 10-15 0 07. 16-22 0 08. 23-33 1 09. 34-50 1 10. 51-75 1 11. 76-112 -- High support V62 Military personnel per 10,000 Adults, early 1960's (1) V66 Internal security forces per 1,000 adults, mid-1960's, (1) V68 Restrictions on political participation, 1960-1963, (2) Seventeen types of action were defined on a PRIORI grounds as value-depriving political restrictions, including harassment and banning of parties of various sizes, banning of political activity, and improper dismissal of elected assemblies and executives. These were ranked on a six-point intensity scale, as follows: 1. Amalgamation of splinter party with larger party restriction or harassment of splinter party 2. Banning of splinter party Amalgamation of minority party with larger party Restriction or harassment of minority party 3. Banning of minority party Amalgamation of a major party with another major party Restriction or harassment of major party 4. Banning of major party Improper dismissal of regional representative body Improper dismissal of elected regional executive 5. Ban on party activities, parties allowed to continue their organizational existence Improper dismissal of national legislature, with provision for calling a new one within a year Improper dismissal of elected chief executive, with provision for replacement within a year 6. Dissolution of all parties, ban on all political activity Improper dismissal of national legislature, no short- term provision for re-establishment Improper dismissal of elected chief executive, no short-term provision for re-election Then, each such action was weighted by the proportion of population politically mobilized (Var. 14). The score for each action identified is the product of the intensity and extent scores. The country score is the sum of such "action" scores for 1961 through 1963. V69 Governmental Value-depriving policies, 1960-1963, (2) New value-depriving policies of governments were defined as any new programs or actions that appeared to take away some significant proportion of attained values from a numerically or socially significant group; for example, land reform, tax increases, restrictions on trade, limitations of civil liberties, restrictive actions against ethnic, religious, or economic groups, and so forth. Two aspects of such policies were taken into account in scaling for intensity: the degree of deprivation imposed, and their equality of application. The "degree of deprivation" scale values are: small = 1, moderate = 2, substantial = 3, most or all = 4. The "equality of application" scale values are: uniform = 1, discriminatory = 2. The intensity score is the product of values on these two scales. The most intensely depriving policies are assumed to be those intentionally discriminatory and designed to deprive the affected group of most or all the relevant value, e.g., seizure of all property of absentee landlords without compensation (score = 8). Deprivation is inferred to be least intense if the policy is uniformly applicable to all the affected class of citizens and deprives them of only a small part of the value, e.g., a five percent increase in corporation tax rates (score = 1). The extent measure is a crude estimate of the proportion of the adult population likely to be directly affected, the permissible values being .01, .02, .05, .10, .20, .40, .60, .80, and 1.00. The score for each policy identified is the product of the intensity and extent scores: the country score is the sum of such "policy" scores for 1961 through 1963. V71 Number of Negative sanctions, 1955-1960 V83 Success of Dissidents in internal wars 1850-1960, (3) Included are civil and guerrilla wars, popular revolts, large-scale terrorism, and private wars which began before 1958. Internal wars which began before 1958 and continued in 1961 are coded on the basis of their status at the end of 1960. Those beginning in 1958 and later are not taken into account. Each country is coded on the basis of its most successful internal war. Older internal wars presumably have less influence on cultural traditions than recent ones. Scores were adjusted to take this into account: if the last internal war in a country ended before 1901, the score is divided by 2 and rounded up to the nearest whole number. See appendix E for country scores. 16 0. No internal wars were fought between 1850 and 1960 by culture groups now comprising the country. 18 1. One or more unsuccessful internal wars Internal wars are "unsuccessful" if the underdogs are quickly suppressed and no changes of consequence occur in governmental policy, personnel, or institutions that favor the underdogs' cause. 14 2. One or more small-scale, party-successful internal wars. Internal wars are "small- scale" if confined to less than a third of the social area of a country and do not directly affect the capital city. Internal wars are "partly- successful" if the under- dogs briefly or partially attain their goals. Continuation of an internal war for more than three years if PRIMA FACIE evidence of partial success, even if it is subsequently suppressed. In a private war, an unsanctioned standoff between contending groups is a "partial success," i.e., neither group secures a clear-cut increase in its position relative to the other, neither is heavily penalized for its actions. 14 3. One or more medium or large-scale, partly- successful internal war. 11. 4. One or more successful internal wars. Internal wars are "successful" if: -- in a civil war or rebellion, the underdogs secede or gain autonomy for a decade or more; -- in a guerrilla war, revolt, and terrorism, the underdogs gain power for a year or more; -- in a private war, one of the contending groups eliminates, expels, or subjugates its opponents 13 5. One or more successful internal wars PLUS one large-scale internal war, directly affecting almost all regions and groups, whether or not successful. V84 Success of conspiracies 1900-1960, (3) Included are coups d'etat, attempted coups which reach the stage of overt action, military rebellions, and assassinations of heads of state, chief executives, and other national leaders (but not always attempted assassinations). See Appendix E for tables. 35 0. No conspiracies 8 1. A few (no more than a total of two) unsuccessful coups, military rebellions or assassinations. Such events are "unsuccessful" if: -- in an attempted coup, the dissidents fail to attain power; -- in a military rebellion, the dissidents fail to attain power or to gain substantial concessions for the military; -- in an assassination, the successor(s) to the assassinated individual(s) do not substantially alter policies. 12 2. A number (more than two) of unsuccessful coups, rebellions, and/or assassinations; OR one successful one and one or more unsuccessful ones. 11 3. Two successful coups, rebellions and/or assassinations between 1900 and 1960. 20 4. Three or more successful coups, rebellions, and/or assassinations between 1900 and 1960. V85 Success of Group Protest 1940-1960, (3) Included are anti-government riots and demonstrations, political clashes, and political strikes. These codings are of questionable reliability, because based on limited information. 13 0. Little or no reported turmoil, 1940-1960. 30 1. Substantial turmoil, met by rather consistently coercive government response without substantial, direct concessions. 16 2. Substantial turmoil, with governmental response varying between coercive and favorable but without major directly-responsive changes in personnel, policies, or institutions. 14 3. Turmoil associated with a successful coup d'etat or one or more instances of partly/wholly successful internal war; or one or more instances of turmoil leading to major change in policies favoring the underdogs on at least one occasion. 13 4. One or more instances of turmoil, not in the context of conspiracy or internal war, leading to major and enduring changes in governmental personnel and/or institutions favoring the underdogs. V87 Regency of military intervention in politics as of December, 1960, (2) Military intervention, 1910 through 1960, was coded from various historical and journalistic sources. Three kinds of events were treated as evidence of disloyalty: (a) any large-scale attempt to overthrow the existing regime in which military or police units were major participants, whether or not successful: (b) any successful attempt, however short-lived, by active members of the military or police to seize power: and (c) any large-scale regional rebellion in which military units were the primary participants. Small-scale plots said to involve military or police personnel were not taken into account; nor were assassination attempts, or mutinies concerned only with pay or promotion policies. See appendix E for years of last intervention and country scores. 10 1. The polity last experienced military intervention between 1958 and 1960, inclusive 11 2. The polity last experienced military intervention between 1951 and 1957, inclusive 23 3. The polity last experienced military intervention between 1935 and 1950, inclusive 24 4. As of 1960, the polity or its metropolitan power had been autonomous for 25 years or more and had experienced no military intervention since 1910. V89 Number of Riots, 1955-1960 V91 Number of strife deaths, 1955-1960 V93 Number or armed attacks, 1955-1960 V95 Number of demonstrations, 1955-1960 V96 Number of irregular power transfers (mostly coups), 1948- 1960 V104 Estimated total magnitude of civil conflict, 1955-1960 V105 Estimated magnitude of turmoil (group protest), 1955-1960 (4) V106 Estimated magnitude of internal war (rebellion), 1955-1960, (4) V107 Character of national political institutions, 1960 (2) 7 1. Institutions are wholly or primarily accretive and autochthonous: reformations, if any, had indigenous roots (although limited foreign elements may have been assimilated into indigenous institutions). 20 2. Institutions are a mixture of substantial autochthonous and foreign elements, e.g., polities with externally derived parliamentary and/or bureaucratic systems grafted to a traditional monarchy. 18 3. Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were deliberately chosen by indigenous leaders, and have been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions. (By adaptation is meant either the modification of regime institutions themselves or development of intermediate institutions to incorporate politically the bulk of the population.) 16 4. Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, have been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions, but were inculcated under the tutelage of a foreign power rather than chosen by indigenous leaders of their own volition. 14 5. Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were deliberately chosen by indigenous leaders, but have not been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions. 9 6. Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were inculcated under the tutelage of a foreign power, and have not been adapted to indigenous political conditions. 2 7. Institutions are imposed, and maintained under threat of sanctions, by foreign powers (including polities under colonial rule as of 1965). V111 Degrees of autocracy in national political institutions, 1960 (6) Variables 111-113 denote properties of political systems (polities of 1960, using the 7-point scales of autocracy, democracy, and anocracy described in Gurr, "persistence," (p. 1487.), and the data base reported there. The following exceptions apply to the year of reference. Eight countries were undergoing political transitions in 1960, so were coded on the basis of the authority characteristics of their first post-1960 polity: Algeria (1963), Cameroun (1961), Kenya (1965), Malagasy (1961), Syria (1961), Tanganyika (1963), Uganda (1962), and Zambia (1964). The Congo had no effective central government for most of the period, so was coded 0 for autocracy and democracy, 6 for anocracy. The colonies of Puerto Rico and Hong Kong were coded on the basis of less detailed information on their internal authority structures ca. 1960, which were predominately democratic and autocratic, respectively. See Polity codebook, Var. 40-47 for full definitions: 28 0. None 21 2. Minimum, score one 7 2. Score two 3 3. Score three 8 4. Score four 18 5. Score five 1 6. Score six 0 7. Maximum, score seven V112 Degree of democracy in national political institutions, 1960, (6) See Var. 111 34 0. None 6 1. Minimum, score one 4 2. Score two 3 3. Score three 12 4. Score four 3 5. Score five 17 6. Score six 7 7. Maximum, score seven V117 Political Cohesiveness, taking into account national integration and unity and degree of political centralization, late 1950's/early 1960's, (3) This index is constructed from scales of "national integration and unity" and "political centralization" devised by Adelman and Morris. The scales are summarily listed below; for full definitions, see the source. NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND UNITY 4 Marked degree of national integration, indicated by common language and culture, integration of central and local political systems, sense of national unity 3 Moderate degree of national integration 2 Small degree of national integration 1 Parked absence of national integration POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION 3 Highly centralized, effective government control through most of country 2 Administrative decentralization of political power 1 Central governments did not maintain effective administrative control in important parts of country Third-world countries are coded on these scales in Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, SOCIETY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH; and all others were coded using various country and comparative studies. The index is constructed by adding "national integration" and "political centralization" scores for each country resulting in a 1-7 scale. 2 1. Low cohesiveness 9 2. 6 3. 14 4. 26 5. 21 6. 8 7. High Cohesiveness