Spring, 2007 Professor David Canon

Political Science 826 413 North Hall

The Legislative Process Phone: 263-2283

Wednesday 3:30-5:25 p.m. Office Hours: T. 1-2, Th. 4-5 p.m. and by appt.

North Hall 422 Email: dcanon@polisci.wisc.edu

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This seminar is designed to introduce you to the major topics of research on and the major theoretical approaches to studying the United States Congress. The central questions are: what motivates the behavior of members of Congress, how do they structure institutions to meet their goals, how do structures affect outcomes, how do members of Congress interact with the President, the bureaucracy, interest groups and the public . . . ultimately, how important is Congress for the making of public policy and why? We will only be able to cover a small fraction of the work on Congress, but I will attempt to introduce you to some of the classics in the area as well as give you a taste of the best work that is currently being done. We will begin the semester with several weeks on the major approaches to studying Congress: new institutionalism, rational choice (distributive, informational, and partisan), behavioral, and historical. Next we will examine Congress on several different levels: individual level (representation and elections), the institutional level (committees, parties, rules, and the floor), and extra-institutional (Congress and the executive and judiciary). The semester ends with a focus on normative work on Congress. How should the institution be structured and how can its performance be improved?

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1) The quality of this seminar will largely depend on the level of participation from all students. Everyone is expected to read the required readings by the day of the seminar and be willing and able to participate meaningfully in discussions. It is essential to have a good understanding of each article, not only individually but also how they fit together.

2) You will write a 15 page (or so) paper that addresses one of the research questions raised in the seminar. This is not to be a synthetic work, but rather a paper that defines a problem, briefly reviews the state of knowledge on the issue, and then presents a proposal for future research.

3) You also will write four short papers (3-4 pages) that summarize and critique the readings for a given week. No outside reading is required for these papers.

4) There will be a final examination. The exam will probably have three questions. We will discuss the format of the exam (how long you will have to work on it, take-home or in-class) later in the semester.

COURSE EVALUATION

The seminar pape and the final exam will each comprise a 30% of your grade, the four short papers are 5% each, and seminar participation is the remaining 20%.

COURSE READINGS The following books are required reading for the course:

David T. Canon, Race, Redistricting and Representation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. University of Chicago Press, 1998.

Gary Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

The rest of the course readings will be in the graduate reading room on the third floor of North Hall (I will also make these readings available on the first day of class for photocopying).

COURSE OUTLINE

Suggested Readings are indicated with a * (these are not included in the photocopied readings).

Part One--Theories and Methods

January 24^th – Approaches to Studying American Politics (no assigned reading for the first seminar)

*Robert Dahl, "The Bahavioralist Approach," APSR 60:4 (December, 1961): 763-72.

*William Riker, "Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics," The State of the Discipline, Ada Finifter ed., 47-67; and conclusion to The Art of Political Manipulation, 1986, 142-52.

*Richard Fenno, "Observation, Context, and Sequence in the Study of Politics," APSR 80:1 (March, 1986): 3-15.

*Theodore J. Lowi, "The State in Political Science: How We Become What We Study." APSR 86:1 (March, 1992): 1-7.

General reviews of the Congress literature:

*Gerald Gamm and John Huber, “Legislatures as Political Institutions: Beyond the Contemporary Congress,” in Political Science: State of the Discipline (Centennial Edition), New York: W.W. Norton, 2002, 313-41.

*Nelson W. Polsby and Eric Schickler. "Landmarks in the Study of Congress since 1945: Sketches for an Informal History." Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001.

*Davidson, Roger. “Legislative Research: Mirror of a Discipline.” In Political Science: Looking to the Future, Vol.4, Northwestern University Press, 1991, 17-36.

*Mezey, Michael L. "Legislatures: Individual Purpose and Institutional Performance." In Political Science: The State of the Discipline II. Ada Finifter editor. Washington, D.C.: APSA, 1993, 335-64.

*Rieselbach, Leroy. "The Forest for the Trees: Blazing Trails for Congressional Research," in Political Science: The State of the Discipline. Ada Finifter editor. Washington, D.C.: APSA, 1983, pp. 155-88.

January 31^st – The Rational Choice Approach

Cameron, Charles, Chapter 3 in Veto Bargaining, 69-82.

Shepsle and Weingast, “Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions,” Chap. 1 in edited book by the same name (hereafter, PTCI), pp. 5-36.

Arnold, Douglas R. The Logic of Congressional Action, Chapters 1, 4 and 6, pp. 3-16, 60-87, 119-146.

Krehbiel, Keith, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking Chapters 1+2, pp. 3-48.

*Weingast, Barry. “Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives.” In A New Handbook of Political Science. Edited by Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Oxford University Press, 1996, 167-90.

*Mayhew, David. Congress: The Electoral Connection. Part One, pp. 1-77.

*Shepsle, Kenneth A. "Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures." Legislative Studies Quarterly 10:1 (February, 1985): 5-19.

*Ferejohn, John A. and Fiorina, Morris P. "Purposive Models of Legislative Behavior." American Economic Review 65:2 (May, 1975): 407-414.

February 7^th – Elaborations and Extensions: Informational Theory, Partisan Theory, and Ideas and Interests

Krehbiel, Keith. Information and Legislative Organization, Chapter 3, pp. 61-103.

Cox, Gary W. and Mathew McCubbins. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (University of California Press, 1993), pp. 85-135.

Smith, Steven S. “Positive Theories of Congressional Parties.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 25:2 (May, 2000): 193-215.

Kingdon, John. "Politicians, Self-Interest and Ideas," in Reconsidering the Democratic Public, George Marcus and Russell Hanson eds., pp. 73-89.

*Aldrich, John, “Political Parties and Governance,” Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America, pp. 194-240.

February 14^th – New Institutionalism, Behavioralism, and Critics of Rational Choice Approaches

Rockman, Bert A., “The New Institutionalism and the Old Institutionalism,” in New Perspectives on American Politics, Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds., 1994, 143-61.

Sala, Brian R. “The New Institutionalism and the Study of Old Institutions.” The Political Methodologist, Newsletter of the Political Methodology Section, American Political Science Association, 8:1 (Fall, 1997).

Kingdon, John L., Congressmen’s Voting Decisions, University of Michigan Press, 3rd ed. 1989, Chapters 1, 10-12, pp. 3-25, 242-95.

Hall, Richard L., Participation in Congress, Chapters 1-2, pp. 1-48.

Green, David and Ian Shapiro, “Legislative Behavior and the Paradox of Voting” and selection from their conclusion, pp. 98-120,142-46,196-204, from Pathologies of Rational Choice.

*Chubb, John E. And Paul E. Peterson, “American Political Institutions and the Problem of Governance,” in Can Government Govern?, Chubb and Peterson, eds., Brookings, 1989, 1-43.

*Moe, Terry M. “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story” and comment from Morris Fiorina, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (Special Issue, 1990): 213-61.

*Hall, Richard L. “Empiricism and Progress in Positive Theories of Legislative Institutions,” and response by Morris Fiorina (“Afterword (But Undoubtedly Not the Last Word)”), pp.273-312 in PTCI.

February 21^st – Historical Research

Swift, Elaine and David W. Brady. “Out of the Past: Theoretical and Methodological Contributions of Congressional History,” PS: Political Science and Politics 24:1, 61-64.

Gamm, Gerald. “Buried Treasure: Theory and Historical Data.” The Political Methodologist, Newsletter of the Political Methodology Section, American Political Science Association, 8:1 (Fall, 1997).

Katznelson, Ira. “Reflections on History, Method, and Political Science.”The Political Methodologist, Newsletter of the Political Methodology Section, American Political Science Association, 8:1 (Fall, 1997).

Aldrich, John. “Does Historical Political Research Pose Any Special Methodological Concerns?”The Political Methodologist, Newsletter of the Political Methodology Section, American Political Science Association, 8:1 (Fall, 1997).

Katz, Jonathan, N., and Brian R. Sala, “Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection,” American Political Science Review, v. 90, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 21-33.

Bianco, William T., David B. Spence, and John D. Wilkerson, “The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress: The Case of the Compensation Act of 1816,” American Journal of Political Science, v. 40 no. 1, February 1996, pp. 145-171.

Crook, Sara Brandes, and John R. Hibbing, “A Not-so-distant Mirror: the 17^th Amendment and Congressional Change,” American Political Science Review, v. 91, no. 4, December 1997, pp. 845-53.

Gamm, Gerald, and Shepsle, Kenneth. "Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825." LSQ 14:1 (February, 1989): 39-66.

Kernell, Samuel, and Michael P. McDonald. “Congress and America’s Political Development: The Transformation of the Post Office from Patronage to Service.” AJPS, 43:3 (July, 1999): 792-811.

*David R. Mayhew, America’s Congress (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

*Polsby, Nelson, How Congress Evolves: Social Bases of Institutional Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

*Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress, Princeton University Press, 2001.

*Swift, Elaine K. “Electoral Connection Meets the Past: Lessons from Congressional History, 1789-1899.” Political Science Quarterly 102:4.

*Hansen, John Mark. “Choosing Sides: The Creations of the Agricultural Policy Network in Congress, 1919-1932.” Studies in American Political Development 2 (1987): 183-229.

*Binder, Sarah A. and Steven S. Smith. Politics or Principle: Filibustering in the United States Senate. Brookings, 1997.

*Canon, David T., and David J. Sousa. 1992. "Party System Change and Political Career Structures in the U.S. Congress." Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17: 347-63.

*Hansen, John Mark. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981. University of Chicago Press, 1991.

*Polsby, Nelson. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives.” American Political Science Review 62:2 (1968): 144-68.

*Stewart, Charles H. Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, 1865-1921. Cambridge University Press, 1989.

*Swift, Elaine. The Making of an American Senate: Reconstitutive Change in Congress, 1787-1841. University of Michigan Press, 1996.

(Note we also will have one week on normative approaches to studying Congress. Logically that week should come here on the syllabus, but in practical terms, we will have a better discussion of what Congress should be doing after you have a better understanding of how it works and what it is doing.)

Part Two--Congressional Elections and Representation

February 28^th – Representation: Members of Congress and Their Constituents

Lee, Frances E. “Representation and Public Policy: The Consequences of Senate Apportionment for the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds.: JOP 60: (February, 1998): 34-62.

Canon, David, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, Preface, Intro, and Chapters 1 and 5, xi-59, 201-42.

Lapinski, Daniel. “The Effect of Messages Communicated by Members of Congress: The Impact of Publicizing Votes.” LSQ 26:1 (February, 2001): 81-100.

Theriault, Sean M. The Power of the People: Congressional Competition, Public Attention, and Voter Retribution (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2005), chapters 1-3, pp. 1-50.

*Rehfield, Andrew, The Concept of Constituency: Political Representation, Democratic Legitimacy, and Institutional Design (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

*Bailey, Michael. “Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983-94.” LSQ 26:1 (February, 2001): 45-80.

*Lee, Frances, “Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics.” APSR 94:1 (March, 2000): 59-72.

*Sundquist, James L. "Representation and the Will to Govern." Chapter 15, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981, pp. 440-59.

*Achen, Christopher. "Measuring Representation." AJPS 22:3 (August, 1978): 475-510.

*Fenno, Richard F. "U.S. Members in their Constituencies: An Exploration." APSR 71 (1977): 883-917.

*Fiorina, Morris, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, 2^nd ed., Yale University Press, 1989.

*Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E. "Constituency Influence in Congress." APSR (March, 1963): 45-57.

*West, Darrell M. "Activists and Economic Policymaking in Congress." AJPS 32:3 (August, 1988): 662-80.

*Bianco, William T. Trust: Representatives and Constituents. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994

March 7^th --Race and Representation in Congress

Guinier, Lani, “The Representation of Minority Interests in Congress,” In Classifying by Race, Paul Peterson, ed. Princeton University Press, 1995, 21-49.

Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran, “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?,” American Political Science Review, v. 90, No. 4, December 1996, pp. 794-812.

Lublin, David. “Racial Redistricting and African American Representation.” APSR 93:1 (March, 1999): 183-86. Response to Lublin from Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran. “A Social Science Approach to Race, Redistricting, and Representation,” same issue, 187-91.

Kenneth Shotts, “Does Racial Redistricting Cause Conservative Policy Outcomes?” JOP 65:1 (February, 2003): 216-226. Reply from David Lublin and Stephen Voss, “The Missing Middle,” same issue of JOP, 227-237. Rejoinder from Shotts, pp. 238-43.

Canon, David. Race, Redistricting, and Representation, Chapters 3, 4, and 6, 93-200, 243-64.

*Tate, Katherine, Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and their Representatives in the U.S. Congress (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).

*Overby, L. Marvin and Kenneth M. Cosgrove, “Unintended Consequences?: Racial Redistricting and the Representation of Minority Interests,” The Journal of Politics, v. 58, no. 2, May 1996, pp. 540-550.

*Richard Fenno, Going Home: Black Representatives and their Constituents, University of Chicago Press, 2003.

*Katherine Tate, Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S. Congress, Princeton University Press, 2003.

*Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson, Chapter 3 in Race and the Transformation of American Politics, Princeton University Press, 1989, 59-88.

*Brace, Kimball; Bernard Grofman, and Lisa Handley. 1987. "Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help Republicans?" Journal of Politics 49: 169-85.

*Davidson, Chandler, and Bernard Grofman, eds. 1994. Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

*Dawson, Michael C. 1994. Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

*Lublin, David Ian. 1997. The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymander and Minority Interests in Congress. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

*Swain, Carol. 1993. Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

March 14^th --Congressional Elections and Campaign Finance

Gary C. Jacobson, Samuel Kernell, and Jeffrey Lazarus, “Assessing the President’s Role as Party Agent in Congressional Elections: The Case of Bill Clinton in 2000,” LSQ, 29:2 (May, 2004): 159-84.

Cox, Gary W. And Eric Magar. “How Much is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?” APSR 93:2 (June, 1999): 299-309.

Theilmann, John and Allen Wilhite. “Campaign Tactics and the Decision to Attack.” JOP 60:4 (November, 1998): 1050-62.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James Snyder, and Charles Stewart. “Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections,” AJPS 45:1 (January, 2001): 136-59.

Brandice Canes-Wrone, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan, “Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Member’s Voting,” APSR, 96:2 (March, 2002): 127-40.

Carson, Jamie L., Erik J. Engstrom, and Jason M. Roberts, “Redistricting, Candidate Entry, and the Politics of Nineteenth Century U.S. House Elections, AJPS 50:2 (April, 2006): 283-93.

*Engstrom, Erik J. “Stacking the States, Stacking the House: Partisan Consequences of Congressional Redistricting in the 19^th Century,” APSR 100:3 (August, 2006): 419-28.

*Jacobson, Gary C.. The Politics of Congressional Elections.

*Jacobson, Gary C. and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).

*Herrera, Richard, and Michael Yawn. “The Emergence of the Personal Vote.” JOP 61:1 (February, 1999): 136-50.

*Erikson, Robert S. "Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: a Review of the Macrolevel Evidence." AJPS 34:2 (May, 1990): 373-399.

*Jacobson, Gary C. "Does the Economy Matter in Midterm Elections?" AJPS 34:2 (May, 1990): 400-407.

*Born, Richard. "Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis." AJPS 34:3 (August, 1990): 615-45.

*Mayhew, David R. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals." Polity 6:3 (1974): 295-317.

*Fiorina, Morris P. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy did it." APSR 71 (March, 1977): 177-81.

*Jacobson. Gary C. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments." AJPS 34:2 (May, 1990): 334-62.

*Green, Donald P. and Krasno, Jonathan S. "Rebuttal to Jacobson's 'New Evidence for Old Arguments'." AJPS 34:2 (May, 1990): 363-72.

*Kenney, Christopher, and Michael McBurnett. "A Dynamic Model of the Effect of Campaign Spending on Congressional Vote Choice." AJPS 36 (November, 1992): 923-37.

*Erikson, Robert S. and Thomas R. Palfrey. “Campaign Spending and Incumbency: An Alternative Simultaneous Equations Approach.” JOP 60:2 (May, 1998): 355-73.

*King, Gary, and Gelman, Andrew. "Systematic Consequences of Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections." AJPS 35:1 (February, 1991): 110-38.

*Wright, Gerald C. and Berkman, Michael B. "Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections." APSR 80:2 (June, 1986): 567-88.

Part Three--Testing Distributive, Informational, and Partisan Theories: Institutional Structures and Congressional Behavior

March 21^st – Parties in Congress

Krehbiel, Keith. Pivotal Politics, Chapters 8-10, 165-236.

Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, Chapters 1-3, 9-10 1-49 171-229.

Snyder, James and Tim Groseclose, “Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting.” AJPS, 44:2 (April, 2000): 193-211.

Krehbiel, Keith. “Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship.” AJPS, 44:2 (April, 2000): 212-227.

Krehbiel, Keith, and Alan Wiseman, “Joseph G. Cannon: Majoritarian from Illinois.” LSQ 26:3 (August, 2001): 357-90.

Lawrence, Eric, Forrest Maltzman, and Paul Wahlbeck. “The Politics of Speaker Cannon’s Committee Assignments,” AJPS 45:3 (July, 2001): 551-62.

*Forgette, Richard and Brian R. Sala. “Conditional Party Government and Member Turnout on Senate Recorded Votes.” JOP 61:2 (May, 1999): 467-84.

*Bianco, William T. And Itai Sened, “Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government: Reassessing Majority Party Influence in Congress and State Legislatures,” APSR 99:3 (August, 2005): 361-72.

*Krehbiel, Keith. “Paradoxes of Parties in Congress.” LSQ 24:1 (February, 1999): 31-64.

*Rohde, David, “Parties and Committees in the House,” pp. 119-38 in PTCI.

*Canon, David, and Kevin S. Price. “Partisan Policymaking in the United States House of Representatives, 1929-1998.” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3-6, 1999, Atlanta, Georgia.

*Krehbiel, Keith, 1993. “Where’s the Party? British Journal of Political Science 23 (2): 235-66.

*McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. “The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress.” Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting. Chicago, Illinois, April 7, 1999.

*Lawrence, Eric D., Forrest Maltzman, and Steven S. Smith. “Who Wins? Party Effects in Legislative Voting.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting. Chicago, Illinois, April 7, 1999.

*Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

*Rohde, David W. Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1991.

March 28^th – Parties, Rules, and Parliamentary Rights

Jason Roberts and Steven S. Smith, “Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, AJPS, 47:2 (April, 2003): 305-17.

Bryan W. Marhsall, “Explaining the Role of Restrictive Rules in the Postreform House,” LSQ, 27:1 (February, 2002): 61-85.

Guillaume R. Frechette, John H. Kagel, and Steven F. Lehrer, “Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules,” APSR 97:2 (May, 2003): 221-32.

Schickler, Eric. “Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1988: A Test of Partisan and Ideological Power Balance Models.” APSR 94:2 (June, 2000): 269-80.

Binder, Sarah, A., “The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990,” American Political Science Review, v. 90, n. 1, March 1996, pp. 8-20.

Krehbiel, Keith. Pivotal Politics, Chapters 4-5, 51-117.

Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, Chapter 4, 50-86.

*Wawro, Gregory J. And Eric Schickler, Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

*Schickler, Eric. “Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1988: A Test of Partisan and Ideological Power Balance Models.” APSR 94:2 (June, 2000): 269-80.

*Krehbiel, Keith, “Restrictive Rules Reconsidered,” American Journal of Political Science, v. 41, no. 3, July 1997, pp. 919-964 (with a response from Dion and Huber).

*Binder, Sarah, A., “The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990,” American Political Science Review, v. 90, n. 1, March 1996, pp. 8-20.

*Schickler, Eric, and Andrew Rich, “Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House,” American Journal of Political Science, v. 41, no. 4, October 1997, pp. 1340-1394 (with a response from Gary Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins).

*Krehbiel, Keith. Pivotal Politics, Chapters 3-5, 51-117.

*Sinclair, Barbara, “House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy,” in PTCI, 235-52.

*C. Lawrence Evans, “Legislative Structure: Rules, Precedents, and Jurisdictions,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 24:4 (November, 1999): 605-42.

*Sinclair, Barbara, Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking, John Hopkins University Press, 1995.

*Brady, David; Cooper, Joseph; and Hurley, Patricia. "The Decline of Party in the U.S. House of Representatives: 1887-1968." LSQ 4 (August, 1979): 381-408.

*Cooper, Joseph, and Brady, David W. "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn." APSR 75 (June, 1981): 411-25.

*Kiewiet, Roderick D. And Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process, University of Chicago Press, 1991.

*Binder, Sarah A. Minority rights, majority rule: Partisanship and the development of Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

*** April 4^th – Spring Break ***

April 11^th – Floor Behavior

Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, Chapters 5-6, 87-123.

Hall, Richard. Participation in Congress, Chapter 7, pp. 175-214.

Jenkins, Jeffrey A. “Examining the Robustness of Ideological Voting: Evidence From the Confederate House of Representatives.” AJPS 44:4 (October, 2000): 811-22.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Laura W. Arnold, and Christopher J. W. Zorn, “The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” American Political Science Review, v. 91, no. 2, June 1997, pp. 324-338.

David C. King and Richard J. Zeckhauser, “Congressional Vote Options,” LSQ, 28:3 (August, 2003): 387-411.

Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers, “The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data,” APSR, 98:2 (May, 2004): 355-70.

Norton, Noelle, H. “Uncovering the Dimensionality of Gender Voting in Congress.” LSQ, 24:1 (February, 1999): 65-86.

*Mucciaroni, Gary, and Paul Quirk. Deliberative Choices: Debating Public Policy in Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

*Kessler, Daniel and Keith Krehbiel, “Dynamics of Cosponsorship,” American Political Science Review, v. 90, no. 3, September 1996, pp. 555-566.

*Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech, “The Multiple Ambiguities of ‘Counteractive Lobbying’”, American Journal of Political Science, v. 40, no. 2, May 1996, pp. 520-69 (with a response by David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright and a rejoinder from Baumgartner and Leech).

*Evans, Diana, “Policy and Pork: The Use of Pork Barrel Projects to Build Policy Coalitions in the House of Representatives,” American Journal of Political Science, v. 38, no. 4, November 1994, pp. 894-917.

*Sullivan, John L., et al. "The Dimensions of Cue-taking in the House of Representatives: Variations by Issue Area." JOP 55 (November, 1993): 975-97.

*VanDoren, Peter M. "Can We Learn the Causes of Congressional Decisions from Roll-Call Data?" LSQ 15:3 (August, 1990): 311-340.

*Hill, Jeffrey S. and Kenneth C. Williams. "The Decline of Private Bills: Resource Allocation, Credit Claiming, and the Decision to Delegate." AJPS 37 (November, 1993): 1008-31.

*Hall, Richard L. "Measuring Legislative Influence." Legislative Studies Quarterly 27 (May, 1992): 205-31.

*Smith, Steven S. Call to Order. Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1989.

*Poole, Keith T. "Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the U.S. Congress." LSQ 13:1 (February, 1988): 117-33.

*Poole, Keith T. And Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll Call Voting, Oxford University Press, 1997.

April 18^nd – Congressional Committees

Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, Chapter7-8, 124-70.

Londregan, John and James M. Snyder, “Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences,” In PTCI, 139-72.

Maltzman, Forrest and Steven S. Smith, “Principals, Goals, Dimensionality, and Congressional Committees,” in PTCI, 253-72.

Adler, E. Scott and John S. Lapinski, “Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituenc y Characteristics Approach,” American Journal of Political Science, v. 41, no. 3, July 1997, pp. 895-918.

King, David C., “The Nature of Congressional Committee Jurisdictions, American Political Science Review, v. 88, No. 1, March 1994, pp. 48-62.

Stewart, Charles III and Tim Groseclose. “The Value of Committee Seats in the House, 1947-1991.” AJPS 42:2 (April, 1998): 453-74.

*Baughman, John. Common Ground: Committee Politics in the U.S House of Representatives (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).

*Sheingate, Adam D. “Structure and Opportunity: Committee Jurisdiction and Issue Attention in Congress, AJPS 50:4 (October, 2006): 844-59.

*E. Scott Adler, Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System, University of Chicago Press, 2002.

*Maltzman, Forrest. Competing Principals: Committees, Parties, and the Organization of Congress. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998.

*King, David. Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.

*Krehbiel, Keith. Information and Legislative Organization, Chapter 4.

*Hall, Richard. Participation in Congress, Chapter 6.

*E. Scott Adler, “Constituency Characteristics and the ‘Guardian’ Model of Appropriations Subcomittees, AJPS, 44:1 (January, 2000): 104-114.

* Canon, David, and Martin Sweet. “Informational and Demand-Side Theories of Congressional Committees: Evidence from the House and Senate, 1789-1993." Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3-6, 1998, Boston, Mass.

*Talbert, Jeffery C., Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner, “Nonlegislative Hearings and Policy Change in Congress,” American Journal of Political Science, v. 39, no. 2, May 1995, pp. 383-405.

*Hall, Richard L. and Grofman, Bernard. "The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias." APSR 84:4 (December, 1990): 1149-65.

*Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert. "The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress. APSR 87 (September, 1993): 657-71.

*Krehbiel, Keith. "Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?" APSR 84:1 (March, 1990): 149-63.

*Shepsle, Kenneth A and Barry R. Weingast. "Penultimate Power: Conference Committees and the Legislative Process." In Home Style and Washington Work, edited by Morris Fiorina and David Rohde, University of Michigan Press, 1991, 199-217.

*Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." APSR 81:1 (March, 1987): 85-104.

*Krehbiel, Keith, and Shepsle and Weingast. "Why are Congressional Committees Powerful?" APSR 81:3 (September,1987): 929-45.

*Smith, Steven S. "An Essay on Sequence, Position, Goals, and Committee Power." LSQ 13:2 (May, 1988) 151-76.

Part Three- Interbranch Relations

April 25^th – Congress and the Courts

Katzmann, Robert A. Courts and Congress, Chapter 3, Brookings, 1997, 46-68.

Fisher, Louis. “Congressional Checks on the Judiciary.” In Congress Confronts the Court. Edited by Colton C. Campbell and John F. Stack. Lanham, MD: Roman Littlefield, 2001, pp. 21-35.

Hausegger, Lori, and Lawrence Baum. “Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation.” AJPS 43:1 (January, 1999): 162-85.

Segal, Jeffrey, A., “Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts,” APSR, v. 91, no. 1, March, 1997, pp. 28-44.

Sarah A. Binder and Forrest Maltzman, “Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998, AJPS, 46:1 (Jan., 2002), 190-199.

Canon, David T. Race, Redistricting, and Representation, Chapter 2.

*Shipan, Charles R. Designing Judicial Review: Interest Groups, Congress, and Communications Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997.

*Mikva, Abner J. “How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?” North Carolina Law Review 61 (1983): 587-611.

*Fisher, Louis. “Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress.” 63 North Carolina Law Review 63 (1985): 707-47.

*Evans, Larry, Jarrell Wright and Neal Devins. “Congressional Procedure and Statutory Interpretation.” Administrative Law Review, 45:3 (1993): 239-59.

*Brest, Paul. “The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation.” 27 Stanford L. Rev. 585 (1975).

*Devins, Deal. Shaping Constitutional Values: Elected Government, The Supreme Court, and the Abortion Debate. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press (1996).

*Eskridge, Jr., William N. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press (1994).

*Eskridge, Jr., William N., and John Ferejohn. “The Article I, Section 7 Game,” 80 Georgetown. Law Journal 523 (1992).

*Eskridge, Jr., William N. “Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,” 101 Yale Law Journal 331 (1991).

*Eskridge, Jr., William N. “The Judicial Review Game.” 88 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 382-95 (1993).

*Fisher, Louis. “Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the Courts.” 18 Pepperdine Law Review 57-93 (1990).

*Fisher, Louis. Congressional Checks on the Judiciary. CRS Report for Congress. (1997).

*Henschen, Beth M., and Edward I. Sidlow. “The Supreme Court and the Congressional Agenda-Setting Process.” Journal of Law and Politics 5, 685-724 (1989).

*Katzmann, Robert A. “Building Bridges: Courts, Congress & Guidelines for Communication.” Brookings Review 42-49 (Spring 1991).

*Katzmann, Robert A., Editor. Judges and Legislators: Toward Institutional Comity. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution (1988).

*Murphy, Walter. Congress and the Court: A Case study in the American Political Process.

(Many of these recommended readings were drawn from a bibilography prepared by Mitch Pickerill).

May 4^th – Congress, the Presidency, and Divided Government

Krehbiel, Keith. Pivotal Politics, Chapters 3, 6-7, 51-75,118-64.

Cameron, Charles, Veto Bargaining, Chapters 5-6, 123-177.

Coleman, John J. “Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness,” APSR 93:4 (December, 1999): 821-35.

Fang-Yi Chiou and Lawrence Rothenberg, “When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics,” AJPS, 47:3 (July 2003), 503-22.

*Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Who Leads Whom?: Presidents, Policy, and the Public (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006).

*Sarah A. Binder, Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003.

*Jon R. Bond, Richard Fleisher, and B. Dan Wood, “The Marginal and Time-Varying Effect of Public Approval on Presidential Success in Congress.” JOP65:1 (February, 2003): 92-110.

*Andrew D. Martin. “Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers.” APSR 95:2 (June, 2001): 361-78.

*Covington, Cary R., J. Mark Wrighton, and Rhonda Kinney, “A ‘Presidency-Augmented’ Model of Presidential Success on House Roll Call Votes,” American Journal of Political Science, v. 39, no. 4, November 1995, pp. 1001-24.

*Sullivan, Terry, "Bargaining with the President: A Simple Game and New Evidence." American Political Science Review 84:4 (December, 1990): 1167-95.

*Mayhew, David R. “Clinton, the 103rd Congress, and Unified Party Control: What are the Lessons?” In Politicians and Party Politics, Edited by John G. Geer, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, 259-83.

*Edwards III, George C., Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake, “The Legislative Impact of Divided Government,” American Journal of Political Science, v. 41, no. 2, April 1997, pp. 545-563.

*Fleisher, Richard, and Jon Bond. "Assessing Presidential Support in the House II: Lessons from George Bush." AJPS 36 (May, 1992): 525-41.

*Howell, William et al. “Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 25:2 (May, 2000): 285-312.

*McCormick, James M. and Wittkopf, Eugene R. "Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relation, 1947-1988." JOP 52:4 (November, 1990): 1077-1100.

*Meernik, James. "Presidential Support in Congress." JOP 55 (August, 1993): 569-87

*Peterson, Mark. Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.

*Maass, Arthur. Congress and the Common Good. New York: Basic Books, 1983, chaps. 7&8, 119-49.

*Kingdon, John W. Congressmen's Voting Decisions, Chapter 6.

*Woolley, John T. "Institutions, the Election Cycle, and the Presidential Veto." AJPS 35:2 (May, 1991): 279-304.

Part Four--Reforming Congress and Various Normative Issues (May11^th)

Mann, Thomas, and Norman Ornstein, “Restoring Order: Practical Solutions to Congressional Dysfunction,” Reform Institute, Washington, D.C., November, 2006.

Mayer, Kenneth R. and David T. Canon, The Dysfunctional Congress?, Chapter 5, pp. 135-56.

Bessette, Joseph. Chapter 8 from The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government, University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 212-46.

Schoenbrod, David. Chapter 1 from Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses Power Through Delegation, Yale University Press, 1993, pp. 3-21.

Oppenheimer, Bruce, “Abdicating Congressional Power: The Paradox of Republican Control,” in Congress Reconsidered, Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, eds. CQ Press, 1997, pp. 371-89.

Cooper, Joseph. “The Clinton Impeachment Controversy and Public Trust.” In Congress and the Decline of Public Trust, Edited by Joseph Cooper. Westview Press, 1999, pp. 169-84.

*Mann, Thomas, and Norman Ornstein. The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America and How to get it Back on Track (Oxford University Press, 2006).

*Mann, Thomas, and Norman Ornstein. Renewing Congress: A Second Report. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993, 2-31, 47-87.

*Huntington, Samuel P. "Congressional Responses to the 20th Century." In Congress and America's Future. David Truman editor, 2nd edition, pp. 6-38.

*Evans, C. Lawrence and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress Under Fire: Reform Politics and the Republican Majority, Houghton Mifflin, 1997.

*Hibbin g, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, “The Media’s Role in Public Negativity toward Congress: Distinguishing Emotional Reactions and Cognitive Evaluations.” AJPS 42:2 (April, 1998): 475-98.