Representation in
Congress
Descriptive and Substantive, Responsiveness and
Responsibility (normative theory)
Descriptive representation: a Congress that “looks like us”?
lGender. Year of the woman – 1992. Clarence Thomas hearings, Anita Hill
(1991). Nearly 50% increase in the
number of women: 24 new women House members, 5 new senators. All-male Judiciary Committee: “they just
don’t get it.”
lRace – 1992, racial redistricting. 1982 Voting Rights Act, Thornburg v. Gingles (1986).
lOther characteristics: class,
religion, occupation, and previous political experience.
Figure: Women in the
Figure: Minorities in
the
Substantive
representation
lRepresentation on policy
outputs, serving some interests, whether local or national. Link between descriptive and
substantive? Why does descriptive
representation matter?
lTheories of representation:
–delegate –
represent the preferences of your constituents,
–trustee –
represent what is best for the country, what you think is the right
thing to do,
–politico – mixture of the two: delegate on issues on which
constituents have intense views; trustee on issues that are important for
national interests.
Representation, cont.
lDetermining how to serve
constituents’ interests.
–Objective
interests: needs. Differences in types
of districts: income, home-ownership, college education. Poverty, health.
–Subjective
interests: wants. What do people expect
of their members of Congress?
Constituency service, bring home the benefits. Explosion in earmarks. Link to delegate/trustee?
–Mechanisms for
monitoring the constituency: town hall meetings, polling, media, letters. One member said, “I seldom have to sound out
my constituents because I think so much like them that I know how to react to
almost any proposal.” Home style, “one
of us.” Talk about later in the
semester.
lGeographic vs. national
representation. The random national
constituency (Andrew Rehfeld). Pro and cons?
Figures:
Diversity in Congressional districts (3 examples)
Racial Composition of the
Median Family Income, 2001
Percentage of Individuals below 100% of Poverty Line, 2002
Constituents’ expectations
Representation, cont.
lAccountability
–Three faces of
democratic accountability (Sean Theriault). First face – vote with constituents, rewarded
with reelection. Second face – vote
against constituent interests, booted out of office. Third face – Profiles in Courage: vote for
national interests, acting like a trustee.
May survive if member is able to convince constituents. Problem in measuring the second face? How would you go about this?
–Mechanisms for accountability: fire alarm/police patrol. Potential challenger, activated latent interests.
Representation, accountability, cont.
lCompetition hypothesis (minority
party provides accountability).
lAttention hypothesis (when
constituents attend to the fire alarm, member more responsive).
lRetribution hypothesis: member
defeated for going against constituents (both defeat and reduced margin of
victory).
Representation, accountability, cont.
lIssues in measuring
representational linkages: measuring public’s preferences. This issue would not even be raised with
strong programmatic parties. Only
because of individualistic political system that this is even a concern. How to measure?
–Direct and
indirect.
–Alternatives to
measuring constituent preferences: potential challengers, anticipatory
representation of latent opinions.
Preempt challengers by taking their issues.
–Constituency
service/home style.
–Party
competition/national representation: “restless innovation.” Minority party always looking for ways to
become the majority party.
Race and
Representation: representing minority interests in a majority-rule institution
lBackground on my research on
this topic.
– Explaining vs.
understanding.
–Role of an
outsider. Question during deposition on
race about the race of my research assistants.
–Shaw v.
Race and
Representation
lNormative theory, legal work,
and empirical scholars. Gaps between
these subfields: speak different languages and don’t speak to each other.
lRacial gap on measures of
objective interests: income, poverty, health, crime, education. Subjective
constituent interests in black majority districts: racial, part-racial, and
non-racial issues.
lRacial gap on subjective
interests is only on racial and part-racial issues, not non-racial.
Race and Representation
lBlack majority districts as a
vehicle for representing black interests.
Alternative views: multiracial society.
Race is a socially constructed concept:
NYTimes Magazine story about the third-grader
having to choose.
lCritiques of black majority
districts
–From the left – “triumph of tokenism.” Need more fundamental changes. Lani Guinier: proportional interest representation. Similar to John Calhoun’s theories of concurrent majorities and nullification before the Civil War.
Critiques of black majority districts, cont.
lFrom the right. BMDs undermine a
color blind society and deracialization. Whites do an adequate job of representing
black interests.
lFrom the center. BMDs undermine
Democratic majorities by concentrating black voters. How would this work? Also, BMDs place a
ceiling on the level of black representation that is possible. Role of influence districts.
Race and Representation, cont.
lPolitics of difference and the
politics of commonality. Color blind vs.
balancing commonality. Types of members
elected in 1992.
lExamples: Bennie Thompson or Cynthia McKinney compared
to Robert Scott or Albert Wynn.
Responsiveness vs.
responsibility
lThe institutional dilemma
(Mayer/Canon)
Collective action problems.
The collective good of “institutional maintenance” and the common
resource of the prestige of the institution.
Tendency for members to “free ride.”
Run for Congress by running against Congress.
l The policy dilemma. Public, general interest versus constituent interests.
Alternatives to
legislative representation
lDominant executive. Looming struggle over
lDirect democracy – initiative
and referendum. 24 states have it. Limits of this approach: “Jail for judges”
example from